Throughout the legal and practical implementation of the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD), subnational implementing agents experience how this policy works in practice. The feedback, or reloading, of these experiences is an important contribution to create resilient EU water governance and to further elaborate the flexible requirements of this framework directive. However, a gap exists concerning our knowledge on the strategies that implementing actors use to mobilize experiential knowledge. Our objective is therefore to understand the reloading of implementation experiences in the WFD's policy process, by studying the conditions that affect strategic mobilization behavior of implementing agents. We build upon existing studies to explore which mobilization strategies are used in WFD reloading cases, and assess which conditions contribute to the identified strategic agency choices. The main finding of this study is that the mobilizing agents often use a smart combination of framing, coalition-building, venue shopping and timing strategies for reloading implementation experiences as policy-relevant knowledge. The choice of such combinations is affected by agency and institutional structure-related conditions, that is, a mobilizing agent's interests, resources and capacities plus the existing EU water governance network contribute to strategic mobilization behavior. Our study is a first exploration of the topic.
The practical implementation of the WFD and its subsequent interaction with both implementing agents and target groups generates information on how this policy is actually received and works in practice (Zito & Schout, 2009) . This information, which we refer to as implementation experiences, is an important type of experiential knowledge that might trigger policy feedback and influence further steps in the WFD's policy process (Haverland & Liefferink, 2012) .
Implementation experiences are conceptualized in this paper as all information, knowledge and expertise acquired by implementing agents, during or because of the practical implementation of policies.
Implementing agents are professional organizations formally charged with the practical implementation of a specific policy (instrument).
These agencies acquire experiences directly at the (sub)national level and they, or their representatives, mobilize such experiences upwards to the EU level. We consider that governmental agents are the primary key actors involved in implementing the WFD. Hence, the lobbying role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business organizations, interest groups and other stakeholders is not the focus of this paper. The, often strategic, feedback process of implementation experiences is referred to in this article by using the concept of "reloading."
Policies demonstrating a robust capacity to revise and improve regulatory frameworks on-the-go by learning from implementation experiences show more resilience (Zeitlin, 2016) . A resilient EU water governance policy is especially required in times of climate change. Furthermore, due to the relatively open, procedural character of the WFD, and the need for its implementation to be specified iteratively, it is particularly relevant to understand the reloading of implementation experiences in the WFD's policy process. It is also interesting to study reloading at the EU level, because of the large distance between supranational policy-makers in Brussels and implementing agents at the domestic level. In addition, the 28 member states gain different experiences in the EU's convoluted multilevel setting (Héritier, 1996; Treib, 2014) .
Addressing the knowledge gap of reloading is not only relevant from a scientific point of view. The European Commission stresses the relevance of such expertise for improving the practicability and legitimacy of EU legislation in their Better Regulation program (Bouwen, 2002; European Commission, 2016) . The Commission is eager to learn from implementation experiences but is dependent upon domestic implementing agents to gain such experiential knowledge, as it does not have its own implementing agents.
Implementation experiences are recognized as policy-relevant information, which can be used strategically by implementing agents.
The choice to reload implementation experiences, or to abstain from doing this, and how to do so, can be seen as strategic agency behavior.
Understanding such strategic reloading is crucial at a time when European integration is increasingly becoming politicized, the democratic character of the EU is being questioned, and tensions rise between domestic and EU governance (Laffan, 2016; Saurugger, 2016) . Although the importance of EU policy feedback has been acknowledged in political science and practice, reloading has rarely been addressed systematically in EU studies (Breeman & Zwaan, 2009; Treib, 2014) . The objective in this paper is therefore to address this knowledge gap by specifically exploring reloading to understand the WFD's policy process, to formulate directions for further research. More specifically, the paper tries to answer the following questions: which strategic reloading behavior of actors in the WFD's policy process can be identified, and which conditions contribute to such behavior?
The paper is organized into six sections. In section 2 we introduce the conceptual building blocks we use to study strategic reloading in the WFD's policy process. Section 3 clarifies our methods by introducing EU water governance as the policy field under examination as well as the comparative case study design chosen. Section 4 contains an analysis of the mobilization strategies applied in two cases, while section 5 focuses on the conditions that determine the choice of these strategies. We conclude this paper with a discussion of our findings and some suggestions for further research.
| CONCEPTUALIZING THE MOBILIZATION OF IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES
The EU policy process consists of a sequence of interrelated stages, of which agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making take place at the EU governmental level, whereas legal transposition and practical implementation occur at the member state level. Evaluation, however, takes place at both levels ( Figure 1 ). Policy feedback, and particularly the feedback of implementation experiences, can contribute to both change and stability in the policy process (Breeman & Zwaan, 2009; Kingdon, 2014) . The feedback process by which experiences gathered throughout a policy's practical implementation are processed in the (EU) policy process and affect the EU agenda may lead to a reconsideration of the existing policy. This processing is labeled in this study as reloading. Although some scholars describe the policy process as cyclical and straightforward, several empirical studies show that it is iterative and chaotic in practice. We use the cyclical perspective as a heuristic model, but acknowledge that reloading is not linear and may impact all stages of the policy process. Moreover, we are aware that implementation experiences do not necessarily contribute to policy learning and evidence-based policy-making (Breeman & Zwaan, 2009; Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009) (Figure 1 ).
Reloading consists of four crucial steps: (i) implementing agents acquire implementation experiences at the domestic level, (ii) implementing agents and their representatives mobilize these implementation experiences across multiple levels of governance (regionalnational-EU) with the aim to set the EU agenda, (iii) these experiences are received by agents at the EU level, and (iv) these experiences might possibly affect further EU policy-making. We focus in this study on the second step, namely the mobilization of implementation experiences from the regional level into the EU policy process and, more specifically, we focus on agents' strategic mobilization behavior (Figure 1 ).
| Strategies for mobilizing implementation experiences
We expect that agents behave strategically during the mobilization of implementation experiences. They can use such policy-relevant information, for instance, to strive to preserve the status quo, advocate for policy change, or try to block or terminate policies (Kingdon, 2014) .
Existing studies on strategic agency behavior for (EU) agenda-setting and (EU) policy change offer a starting point for the conceptualization of strategic mobilization behavior. We have systematically reviewed these strands of literature from an agency-oriented perspective. Based on the review outcomes, we identify four clusters of strategies that are commonly recognized in theories of agenda setting and policy change. This typology is also in line with more general policy process theories, social movement studies and literature concerning mobilization issues (i.e., Benford & Snow, 2000; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2014; Pralle, 2003) . Table 1 presents a summarizing overview of these strategies and the operationalization used in this research.
The first cluster distinguished is the strategic framing of implementation experiences. As there is a constant flow of experiences, their simple occurrence is not sufficient to enter the EU policy process, nor to influence further policy-making. Actors try to influence policymaking by framing their practical implementation experiences so that they gain agenda status (Princen, 2007) . Framing is seen as a process in which actors transform implementation experiences into a meaningful whole, sense-making device or frame. Framing is dynamic over time and influenced by actors' interests, overarching discourses, preferences and so on (Entman, 1993) . Actors differ in the way they frame experiences to alter support for policies, bring experiences onto the agenda and further their own ideas. To empirically position and assess the frames, we differentiate between three layers of frames: (i) an ontological frame (what is real?), (ii) a normative frame (what is right and wrong, fair and unjust?) and (iii) a strategic frame (what is feasible, what can be done?) (Therborn, 1980; Wiering & Arts, 2006) . Actors can use multiple framing strategies to further their experiences. Narratives, for instance, can be used to convince actors of the necessity of political action or policy implications. One can voice these frames by using rhetoric, symbols, best practice examples and crisis exploitation (Fischer, 2003; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Riker, 1986; Stone, 2002) .
Furthermore, increasing the resonance of frames can be done by aligning frames to the existing discursive opportunity structure. Different alignment strategies can be identified, such as frame bridging, amplification, extension and transformation (Benford & Snow, 2000) .
Second, we identify the cluster of relational management strategies.
Interaction between actors is important because mobilizing actors are mostly unable to accomplish their objectives alone. Mutual trust and respect can enable the mobilization process, and thus trust building and networking are of crucial importance (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; . Networks are important for gathering reliable information, for understanding other participants' positions and interests and for spreading implementation experiences (Kingdon, 2014) . Another strategy in this cluster is coalition building. It is important, particularly in complex multilevel governance settings, to gain support, bundle resources and coordinate activities in coalitions (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996) . Venues can also be manipulated to push forward ideas and interests (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2003; Princen & Kerremans, 2008) , or new venues can be created for such mobilization . Actors aim to shift debates to venues which are receptive and open to their implementation experiences (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2003; Princen, 2007) .
A fourth cluster considered is timing, as actors decide upon the crucial moments of mobilization. This strategy is analytically distinct but in practice related to the other strategies. Often, shock events or other policy momenta, are used to put (implementation) issues on the agenda, as actors seek to "exploit" the disruption of governance 
Relational management strategies
Mobilizing agents interact continuously throughout the mobilization of IE. This is important, e.g.,
for drawing attention and seeking support.
Brouwer and Biermann (2011) as usual. Such moments of attention may be short-lived. Moreover, implementation experiences can also contribute to the opening of such windows (Birkland, 1998; Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Kingdon, 2014) .
| Conditions contributing to strategic mobilization choices
Various conditions contribute to an actor's decision to mobilize implementation experiences, just as to the choice of a specific mobilizing strategy. Following a review of common policy process studies, social movement and EU mobilization literature, and more specific (EU) agenda-setting and policy change literature, we identify three clusters of conditions that may contribute to mobilization (i.e., Benford & Snow, 2000; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2014; Pralle, 2003) . These conditions and their operationalization are summarized in Table 2 .
First, strategic choices concerning whether to and how to mobilize implementation experiences are of course affected by actors' preferences and interests (Radaelli & Kraemer, 2008) . Actors can have different incentives for mobilizing implementation experiences, such as minimizing future implementation costs, overcoming implementation problems, escaping domestic constraints, gaining first-mover advantages or striving for alignment with domestic policies (Héritier, 1996; Liefferink & Andersen, 1998; Princen & Kerremans, 2008) . Vested interests, for example, may trigger the mobilization of positive implementation experiences with the objective of preserving the status quo (Béland, 2010) .
Second, the strategic mobilization of implementation experiences is also affected by an agent's availability of resources and capacities.
This cluster of conditions includes an agent's financial resources, expertise, legitimacy, representative, entrepreneurial and mobilizing capacity, as well as personal skills and characteristics. Other relevant conditions in this regard are an agent's organizational backbone and position in networks (Dudley & Richardson, 1999; Pesendorfer, 2006; Princen & Kerremans, 2008) .
Third, we identify the EU and domestic political and institutional structure as another important cluster of conditions. As reloading does not occur in a vacuum, contextual conditions determine an actor's possibilities and constraints for mobilization (Zhu, 2013) . Several conditions can be identified in this regard. The EU's multilevel setting, and particularly its wide range of venues, channels and other access points, offers a multitude of opportunities for actors to mobilize their experiences. As a result, actors can strategically seek out a venue in which policy-makers are more willing to use their implementation experiences (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Princen & Kerremans, 2008) . Nevertheless, some issues and interests have easier access than others, as the institutional set-up could be more receptive to some arguments than to others. Some venues may be more susceptible to certain implementation experiences than others.
Hence, the openness of the policy system is another condition that affects the chances for actors to gain access to the EU policy process (Pierson, 1993) . Attention, both political and societal, is another crucial condition identified for the strategic mobilization of experiential knowledge. Such attention can be triggered by a policy momentum, as policy windows provide a temporary opportunity to reload implementation experiences (Kingdon, 2014; . 
Timing
Mobilizing agents seek out the crucial moment to mobilize IE and decide upon the timing to use mobilization strategies. Following the original work of Kingdon, the best mobilization opportunity for policy entrepreneurs, and the strongest incentive for policy-makers to respond to implementation experiences, occurs when the implementation of policy programs brings about unforeseen negative consequences, which provides them with an urgency to act (Kingdon, 2014, p. 103) .
The final condition of this cluster is the fit, or misfit, of an EU policy with domestic practices and traditions. A misfit can lead to practical implementation issues, noncompliance or political controversy, which will lead to stronger incentives for reloading. Hence, this condition is strongly related to an agent's preferences and interests, which we identify as the first cluster of relevant conditions (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006) .
| METHODOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
Water management is a relatively stable multilevel policy domain in which a strong Europeanization of policies has been observed (Priest et al., 2016) . Since its establishment in 2000 the WFD has given rise to several implementation challenges (Bourblanc, Crabbé, Liefferink, & Wiering, 2013; Liefferink et al., 2011) . To deal with these issues, the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) was developed in 2001. This key EU water institution aims to operationalize the WFD to resolve technical controversies and allow a more coherent implementation throughout the EU Santbergen, 2013 A comparative case study design is applied to explore empirically which of the above-mentioned strategies are manifest in WFD's reloading processes, and which conditions contribute to such strategic mobilization behavior. We have selected two critical cases of reloading from the WFD's policy implementation process: the one resulting in the so-called "Prague Approach" and the discussion concerning the One-Out-All-Out (OOAO) principle. Selection of these two cases was done via a process-tracing analysis of the CIS process, consisting of a document study and interviews with key actors involved. Both cases are long-term processes of reloading in which implementation experiences turned out to be the trigger, which have been on the agenda for a longer time, and which have been documented in detail.
The study of these two cases is concentrated on the Netherlands. This member state has been selected because of its long tradition in water management, its active involvement in EU water governance and because it was one of the frontrunners in the establishment of the WFD. We expect this member state to also be an active mobilizing actor in the processes of reloading. So, by studying this case, existing strategic behavior will be identified. In addition, the role of other member states has not been excluded. A content analysis of documents, memos and transcripts was made by applying deductive coding. This coding was based on the outcomes of the literature review and, more specifically, on the operationalization of strategies and conditions (Tables 1 and 2 ).
| TWO CASES OF RELOADING
In this section for each of the cases selected we describe the issue at stake, we elaborate upon the implementation experiences of Dutch implementing agents and we analyze the strategic mobilization process. A summarizing overview of outcomes is presented in Table 1 .
| Case one: The Prague Approach
The key objective within the WFD is to achieve a "good ecological status" (GES) for all waters by 2015. This GES is determined based on a water body's biological, hydro-morphological and physico-chemical quality elements (CIS, 2003a) . However, for altered water bodies-both artificial and heavily modified-member states are allowed to set "good ecological potential" (GEP) as an environmental quality objective. This is because changes to the hydro-morphological characteristics of these altered water bodies, which are needed to achieve the GES, would have significant adverse effects on the body's wider environment and its user functions. The GEP is a perceived deviation from a water body's maximum ecological potential (MEP). This MEP should reflect, as far as possible, the conditions associated with the closest comparable natural water body type, given the physical conditions of the specific body (Borja & Elliott, 2007; CIS, 2003a CIS, , 2003b ; Directive 2000/60/EC).
| Dutch implementation experiences
At the start of the WFD's implementation, the Dutch Government qualified 95% of its water bodies as heavily modified (HMWB) or artificial (AWB). An exception is the coastal zone, which is designated as a natural water body. Qualifying bodies as being altered opens up possibilities for less stringent objectives and of extending the timing for achieving these (Ligtvoet, Beugelink, Brink, Franken, & Kragt, 2008) . Altered water bodies are assessed in terms of the GEP. However, Dutch water managers responsible for the WFD's implementation, that is, the regional water authorities and Rijkswaterstaat (the Water and Public Works Department of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment), were struggling with the technical and theoretical approach prescribed in the WFD to determine this GEP (personal communications). Practitioners described the GEP as: "not feasible in practice" and as "problematic for dealing with altered water bodies" (quotes from interviews). Confusion was caused by its ambiguous definition and the unclear measurement method, because the GEP, GES and MEP are all deviations from the norm. Implementing agents lacked specific knowledge about the pristine conditions of a water body, reference conditions and its restoration potential, which were essential to determine the GEP. Furthermore, these actors found it to be extremely difficult to determine a water body's initial or potential natural situation, due to the long history of artificial water management in the Netherlands, and as they were not willing to forfeit the current utility of these water bodies. Moreover, "The GEP measurement method was too technical and theoretical"
(quote from interview). As actors from these two organizations were the key representatives of the Netherlands at the EU level, they started to reload this implementation experience into the EU policy process (personal communication).
| Mobilization strategies chosen
All strategies mentioned in Section 2 could be traced back in the empirical data. We discuss them chronologically. Implementation issues regarding the GEP had been discussed in multiple EU working groups from 2001 onwards. Although guidance had been developed, a common understanding of the GEP was still lacking in 2005 (Borja & Elliott, 2007; CIS, 2003a CIS, , 2003b Table 3 ). As a result, the water directors gave a mandate to the ECOSTAT working group to consider alternatives for the GEP. Hence, the GEP issue was discussed at multiple 
| Dutch implementation experiences
Implementing agencies in the Netherlands experienced several difficulties regarding the OOAO principle. Similarly to the first case, interpretation variations arose. Throughout the implementation, "we [Dutch implementing agents] became aware that the principle is not sensitive to small changes in water quality" and that maps will only color green when all indicators are positive (interview quote).
"Improvements in fish and plant species, for instance, were not visible as some chemical substances were still insufficient" (interview quote).
As a result, they found that it was quite hard to see any progress in water quality. Furthermore, they realized that the effects of measures taken only become quantifiable after longer periods. These were important issues as their regional directors, national parliament and the European Commission called for an overview of progress and a justification of measures, effort and resources invested in the WFD's implementation (Raadgever et al., 2009; personal communication) . At the EU level, Dutch representatives experienced difficulties as well.
Maps following the OOAO principle were used by the Commission to compare progress between member states. Such a comparison was unjust according to the Dutch, because modeling and measurement methods differ significantly between member states. Member states having less advanced monitoring methods were unable to measure certain quality elements and were allowed to assume that these would be at least as good as the worst observed result for that water body. As a result, maps for countries such as Hungry colored green in contrast to further advanced member states, such as the Netherlands (Cunningham, 2012; personal communication) . Ontological Implementation difficulties due to technical and theoretical determination method for determining GEP.
Communication of progress of water status is difficult due to the OOAO principle.
Normative
Aspiration for a more realistic determination approach with sufficient support.
OOAO principle is vague, complex and unfair with regard to the representation of water status.
Strategic
Practical alternative for GEP determination, no change to objectives.
Another visualization method needs to be developed as alternative for communication.
Coalition reluctant for change (Prague: EU Commission, environmental NGOs and Scandinavian member states. OOAO: EU Commission, environmental NGOs, drinking water companies)
Ontological Implementation issues due to lack of clarity about GEP.
OOAO principle is applicable, yet might need some clarification. 
| Mobilization strategies chosen
Interpretation difficulties concerning the OOAO principle were discussed during the first implementation cycle of the WFD (Cunningham, 2012) 
| Comparing the strategies identified
In both reloading cases, all four clusters of strategies were used by Dutch representatives throughout the mobilization of implementation experiences (Table 1) . Regarding strategic framing (1), see also 
| REFLECTION ON CONDITIONS
In this section we reflect upon conditions that contribute to the strategic mobilization of implementation experiences. It appeared that outcomes from the cases were strikingly comparable (Table 2) .
| The role of actors' preferences and interests
Mobilizing agents' preferences and interests are, of course, inherent to, or the rationale behind, all strategies identified for the mobilization of implementation experiences. This rationale behind mobilization is triggered by the experienced mismatch between EU policies and daily In line with this, the Dutch strategically framed in a specific way that the alternative-and pragmatic-approach for determining the GEP would better fit the implementability in all member states (personal communication). In both cases, mobilizing actors framed their experiences following the incentive to change the ongoing implementation of the WFD in line with their own interests (e.g., policy fit and pragmatic implementation), while the opposing group of actors framed the issue in a way to keep the status quo in accordance with their policy preferences (e.g., ensuring ecological ambitions). Except for these two groups, little resistance from other actors emerged, which can be explained given that most states were lagging behind in the implementation and, as a result, were not yet concerned with both issues and had less incentives for mobilization (personal communication).
| Availability of resources and capacities
The cases analyzed showed that the condition availability of resources and capacities contributed to actors' ability to mobilize, and more specifically to their choice for applying strategic framing and relational management strategies. Both cases show that the fact that the Dutch, and their allied mobilizing agents, were frontrunners in the WFD's implementation process, had a high priority for water management at the national level and had an established position in the EU network contributed to their active mobilization behavior (personal communication). Regarding relational management strategies, key incentives to build coalitions in both cases were to bundle resources and gain support in the complex EU setting. Speaking with one voice was relevant in both cases to convince reluctant actors (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996) . In the Prague case, the UK, German and Dutch representatives were closely involved in the CIS network (e.g., representatives of the UK and Germany were the co-chairs of the SCG meeting, having close ties to the representatives of the Commission), and hence their networking and mobilizing capacity skills were relatively high. Furthermore, representatives of all three states were very well informed about EU water governance, had a long tradition and high expertise in this field and spoke English sufficiently. The UK representative, as a native speaker and excellent presenter, was strategically chosen to present, and frame, the issue at the water directors' workshop. Bundling these powerful positions, expertise and skills enabled the mobilization of implementation experiences in both cases (Carr & Crosnier, 2005; personal communication) .
| The role of the political and institutional structure
We found that political and institutional structure conditions determine the choice of relational management strategies, multiple venue shopping and strategic timing. Networking and information exchange at the domestic level appeared essential to ensure that regional experiences were mobilized at the EU level by national representatives (Kampa & Kranz, 2005; personal communication; Heuvelhof Ten et al., 2010) Moreover, actors were keen on choosing the suitable moment for mobilization. In both cases, issues were discussed for a longer
period, yet caught fire at certain points in time (CIS, 2003a (CIS, , 2003b Cunningham, 2012; personal communication 
| DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have focused on reloading in the WFD's policy process, and more specifically we have studied strategic mobilization actions of agents involved and conditions that contribute to such strategic behavior. The importance of understanding reloading in the dynamic EU water policy process is significant, as the EU is eager to learn from domestic expertise for improving the practicability and legitimacy of EU water policies. So far, reloading has not yet been systematically addressed in academia. Therefore, this study contributes to the existing Europeanization (e.g., EU policy implementation studies), political sciences and public administration literature. Furthermore, this article contributes to our understanding of the unique field of EU water governance.
Our findings reveal that a smart combination of framing, specifically by best practices and frame alignment, coalition-building, networking and establishing trust, multiple-venue shopping and timing, is used in mobilization processes. As we see in Section 4.3, certain strategies were not used, that is, narratives, rhetoric, symbols, crisis exploitation, venue manipulation and creation. Strategic combinations seemed to be continuously determined by and adapted to the predominant, yet dynamic, conditions, such as the appearance of a policy momentum, changes in the (EU) institutional structure, political attention, degree of consensus and new actors or expertise entering the policy process. Spreading the odds across mobilization strategies increases the possibility that implementation experiences are heard and that they can affect further policy-making. The cases show that conditions related to the interests and preferences of a mobilizing actor-often affected by a misfit between EU regulation and practical implementation, and its available resources and capacities, determine if implementation experiences are mobilized at all. Conditions related to the political and institutional structure turned out to be of considerable importance, such as the existing EU (CIS) water governance network, the water director venue and the access points at multiple levels that contributed to relational management strategies, multiple venue shopping and strategic timing.
While this paper's exploration is an important contribution to better understand reloading, iterative policy implementation and the dynamic EU policy process, its conclusions need to be approached with some caution, which also points to further research needs. First, we studied a limited number of reloading cases. In addition, although the two cases selected are widely acknowledged as crucial moments in the WFD's implementation process, future research should encompass a wider set of cases.
A second point is that both processes were selected from the policy process of one EU directive, the WFD, in the specific policy field of EU water governance. This policy field is known for its relative stability and involves a specific group of expert and govern- 
